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The  Commission,  based  on  the  unanimous  assent  given  by  the  Council  at  its  meeting 
22 December 1993, adopted on 12 April1994
1 its decisions under Article 95 ECSC to authorize aid in 
favour of the fo)_~?VJing European steel companies:  · 
Corporaci6n de Ia Siderurgia Integral (CSI), Spain 
Sidener, Spain 
llva, Italy 
Siderurgia Nacional, Portugal 
EKO Stahl GmbH, Germany 
Sachsische Edelstahlwerke GmbH, FreitaVSachsen, Germany  .  . 
The Commission attached some general conditions to the authorization of aid.  One of  the conditions 
imposed in every case was strict monitoring, with which the Member States concerned must co-operate 
fully. 
In accordance with the monitoring arrangements agreed, Member States concerned should supply the 
Commission twice a year, and not later than 15 March and  15 September respE!ctively, with reports 
containing full information in accordance with the enclosed Annex 1 on each beneficiary company and 
its restructuring.  The first reports were to reach the Commission by 15 March 1994 and the last report 
should reach the Commission by 15 September 1998 unless the Commission decides otherwise. 
The Commission shall, on the basis of these reports, draw up half-yearly reports to be submitted to the 
COuncil not later than 1'st May and 1st November respectively, in order to allow discussion in the Council 
if appropriate. 
The Commission submitted its first report to the Council in Maf.  An updated report covering some 
supplementary information provided by the Governments concerned was submitted in June3• 
The purpose of this communication is to present the Commission's second monitoring report on the 
basis of the information provided by the Member States concerned by  15 September  1994.  The 
material is intended essentially to reflect the situation as at 30 June 1994. 
Separate reports on each company are attached as Annexes 2 - 7.  The infonnatlon contained 
therein shall be treated in the strictest confidence in accordance with Article 47 ECSC. 
These reports should be seen within the context of a continuous and ongoing monitoring process 
whereby information received will be critically assessed and followed up as necessary. 
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Monitoring of Article 95  ECSC steel  cases 
Second Report 
C.S.I. 
Introduction 
The Commission decided on 12 April 1994 to approve aids totalling 437.8 billions ptas. under 
Article 95  ECSC, serving the following purposes·: 
Capital injection of 276.7 billions ptas. 
Social aid up to 54.519 billions ptas. 
Up to 35.5 billions ptas.in the form of a capital conversion of an INl credit to Ensidesa. 
Up.to 9.4 billions ptas.to cover contingencies. 
Loss compensation of up to 61.654 billions ptas.to cover additional operating losses and 
financial charges in 1992 and  1993 and reduced turnover arising from bringing forward 
the Ansio closure. 
Social aids totalling up to maximum of 47.35 billions ptas.  had  previously been authorized 
as compatible with article 4.1  of the Steel  Aid Code. 
In the first monitoring report it was noted that 1993 losses were higher than forecast and that 
it was difficult to compare the actual  losses with those estimated in the plan due to the non 
implementation of one of the key elements of the plan itself : the creation of the successor 
company to AHV and Ensidesa.  · 
Following  up  this  issue  with  the  Spanish  authorities  the  Commission  found  that  a 
misunderstanding had led to a discrepancy in the calculation of the forecasted losses for 1992 
and  1993. The reasons for this and the apparent divergence from the plan were explained to 
the Council  working group on  19.7.94.  A written note was,  at the request of the Council 
working group, distributed later.  This note is attached at Annex I. 
Other outstanding issues arising from the first report will be addressed in the relevant sections 
of the present report. 
Capacity Reductions 
The  capacity  reduction  programme  started  in  March  1994.  Under  its  schedule  all  the 
equipment involved  had to be shutdown by  1996 and dismantled within  two years after the 
closure. 
As at 30.6.94 the following equipment was already closed and dismantled : 
blast furnace n  • 2 at Sestao 
equipment to mould pig iron ingots at Sestao 
moulds workshop at  Sestao 
slabs continuous casting equipment at Gijon 
conventional steel  plant at Gijon  · 
rolling mill for sectional steel at Aviles 
reheating furnaces at Aviles The  closing  and  dismantling  of the  other  facilities  is  expected  to  proceed  according  to 
schedule. 
Investments 
The Spanish authorities report no investments for the first six months of 1994. 
Since the C.S.I.  investment plan  covers a period  of three years  (94-96),  the Commission 
services will  verify  the  impact of this  on  the  realisation  of the restructuring  plan  and  its 
impact on the viability prospects of the company. 
Workforce Reductions 
By the  end  of June  1994,  417  more  workers  had  left the company.  This brings the  total 
workforce reductions since  1991  to 6160 people, or nearly 700 more than scheduled under 
the plan. 
Total social costs incurred during the first six  months of 1994 amounted to  10.524 billions 
ptas.  of which  7.266  billions  ptas.  related  to  payments  to  workers  affected  by  previous 
restructurings. 
These costs were covered by  the Spanish Government under adapted general soCial  security 
arrangements, not constituting state aids,  and the company ( 3.917 billions ptas.) . 
. Since at present no payment of aid  has  been  made,the  impact of the delays  on  the  debt 
position and viability prospects of the company will have to be examined. 
Production and Market Effects 
Production for the first six months of 1994 and the comparison with the same period for i 993 
can be summarized as follows  : 
I st Half 1994  1  st Half 1  993  %  increase 
Liquid steel  2.6  m tons  2.7  m tons  (2.2) 
Hot Rolled Coil  1.84  m tons  1.83  m tons  0.4 
Heavy Plate  .30  m tons  .28  m tons  4.0 
Wire Rod  .21  m tons  .21  m tons  0.8 
Heavy sections  0  11  m tons  .17  m tons  (28.8) 
Variations between the two periods are quite small  except for structural long products. 
These figures,  when annualized, seem generally to be in line with the plan. 
Sales of  finished products (including cold rolled products) in the first half of the year, totalled 
2.66 millions tons,  1.1% above the level  for the first half 1993. 
If this trend is  maintained for the full  year it seems that sales will  be above those planned, 
which were at the level of 4.8  millions tons. First Half 1994 sales breakdowns by market compared with the equivalent period for 1993 
and with the total years 1993  and 1992, were as follows : 
Spanish market 
Other EC  markets 
Third countries 
1st Half 94  1st Half 93  1993  1992 
62.4% 
18.3% 
19.3% 
62.3% 
16.7% 
21.0% 
63.9% 
15.6% 
20.5% 
69.1% 
16.0% 
14.8% 
The  trend,  which  was  already  clear  in  1993,  of a  shift  toward  sales  outside  Spain  and 
especially in countries outside of the EC,  seems to be confirmed by the first half 94 figures. 
The average prices  provided  by  the  Spanish  authorities  show a  net increase in  prices  in 
practically all  products when compared with the same period of last year. 
The  Commission  services  have  examined  this  information  and  concluded  that the  prices 
charged are within the normal range. 
Financial Performance 
Since the new company successor of Ensidesa and  AHV has  not yet been created (see last 
paragraph of this report),  it is impossible to compare directly the actual  figures with those 
forecasted  under the  plan.  Moreover the  plan  contained  yearly  figures  only  so  that  final 
conclusions will have to  await the aimual  1994 results when available. 
For the present, an analysis has to be limited to comparison of the first half 1994 results with 
the results for the same period of 1993 as provided by the Spanish authorities and combined 
for the two companies. 
(in billions ptas.)  I st Half 1994  1  st Half 1993  %change 
Turnover  149.8  124.5  20.3 
Profi ts/(Losses)  (27.9)  (54.0)  48.3 
Net Operating Results  (3.1)  (30.3)  89.8 
Financial charges  15.8  2.0  (28.2) 
L. &  S.  Term Debts  486.5  499.3  (2.0) 
The improvements over the first half of last year are quite evident especially in the operating 
results. However, the total  level of debts,  even if decreased,  still remain very high. 
In  table I (attached), the Commission services,  after having estimated the economic results 
of AHV and Ensidesa for the full year 1994, have made a comparison with the performance 
forecasted in the restructuring plan. 
Since the income from  the sale of these two companies to the new company "V"  have not 
been  received  as  planned by  the  "dormant"  AHV  and  Ensidesa companies,  and  since the 
forecast aid has not been paid yet to the same companies in order to balance their accounts, 
these amounts have to  be deducted from  the plan in  order to make the figures comparable. This operation done, it can be concluded, as shown by  table I,  that if C.S.I. losses remain at 
the estimated level,  these  losses will  be in  line with  the financial  performance forecasted 
under the restructuring plan. 
Aid payments 
Capitalisation 
In February 1994 both Ensidesa and AHV proceeded with capitalisation operations for which 
provision had been made in  their 1993  balance sheets. 
Credits that were subject to capitalisation were (value 1.1.92) : 
For AHV:  a total  of 41.024 billions ptas  which remained from  91.1  billions ptas.  of 
credits authorized  to  be  converted  into capital  under Protocol  I 0 of Spain Treaty of 
Accession. 
For Ensidesa: 35.5 billions ofiNI credits explicitly authorized under the art. 95 decision. 
The total  of these  credits,  plus  reactualisations  for  20.9  billions  ptas.,  amounted  to  97.4 
billions. The total sum  has been used for capitalisation operations for AHV of 38.8 billions 
ptas.  and for Ensidesa of 58.6 billions ptas. 
The Commission is examining further these operations. 
Other Aids 
According to the Spanish authorities no  other aid has been received. 
Terms and conditions of new loans 
In the first monitoring report, the Commission identified various loans and convertible bonds 
used  to  cover  the  higher  than  forecast  losses  and  the  delays  in  aid  payments.  From  an 
examination  of the  terms  and  conditions  of  these  facilities  and  the  associated  state 
guarantees,where applicable, it appears that no  state aid  elements were involved since these 
facilities were at market rates. 
During the course of the first half of 1994, CSI obtained further loans totalling I 0.0 billions 
ptas.  from various banks,  supported by  state guarantee. As for previous loans, the guarantee 
carried a premium  of 0.125% per annum. 
Also convertible bonds totalling 30.0 billions ptas.  have been issued with a state guarantee 
carrying the same premium. 
No  changes were  made  to  the  loans  covered  by  state  guarantee  reported  in  the  previous 
monitoring report. 
As far  as  the loans without state guarantee are concerned, there has been a net increase of 
1.0 billion ptas compared with the previous monitoring report. The Commission is examining these measures in order to assess whether they include state 
aid elements. The Commission is also examining their purpose, whether and to what extent 
they  proved necessary because of the delays in the payment of aids and the impact that the 
resulting additional financial charges might have on longer term viability (in this connection, 
the Commission understands that a consultant has been mandated by the company to review 
and update the plan in the light of the delays and  other changes ( i.e.  acceleration of Ansio 
closure)). 
Privatisations 
On  the  27.7.94  the  new  company  "Aceria  Compacta  de  Bizkaia  S.A."  was  created  and 
registered.  The object of this  company  is  to  construct and  manage  the  new  compact hot 
rolling facility at Sestao partially to replace the hot strip mill at Ansio. 
Shareholders of the company are as follows 
ACERIA COMPACTA DE BIZKAIA S.A. 
SHAREHOLDER  %  SUBCRIBED  NATURE OF THE 
CAPITAL  SHAREHOLDER* 
C.S.I.  30  240.000  Public 
Socade  10  80.000  Public 
B.C.H.  7  56.000  Private 
B.E.X.  7  56.000  Private 
B.B.K.  7  56.000  Private 
B.B.V.  7  56.000  Private 
Bo.  Urquijo  5  40.000  Private 
G.  Esp. Estampac.  5  40.000  Private 
Tuba Consult.  5  40.000  Private 
pa  lribecampo  5  40.000  Private 
Cosimet S.L.  2,500  20.000  Private 
C.A.N.  2,860  22.800  Private 
Cosim S.A.  1  8.000  Private 
F  erroatlantica  1  8.000  Private 
Prom.AC.Comp  1,140  9.120  Private 
Cia!. Laminados  0,500  4.000  Private 
D.Javier Imaz  0,500  4.000  Private 
Ingelectric S.A.  I  8.000  Private 
Bac. Atlantica  1,500  12.000  Private 
100  800.000 
accor  mg to the Spamsh Authont1es. The composition of the Board of Directors is as follows : 
C.S.I.  3 members 
Socade I  member 
Private sector 5 members ( including the president) 
The decisions are taken by  simple majority of the members. 
According to the Spanish authorities the company is 40% public, through the shareholdings 
of CSI and  Socade which is  a public company  representing the local Basque Government. 
The remaining 60%  of the  capital  is  held  by  the  private  sector.  B.C.H.,  B.E.X.,  B.B.K., 
B.B.V. and Bo. Urquijo ( 33% of capital) are banks, and the rest of the capital (27%) is held 
by  various companies including the AC  Sestao promotion company referred to  in the first 
monitoring report (1.14%). 
The Commission will be verifying  the genuine private nature of these companies, the range 
of their activities and  their  participation  in the  new company  in  order to  ensure that the 
requirements of the article 95  decision are met. 
Creation of the new "V"  company 
According to  the restructuring  plan,  the  two companies  Ensidesa and  AHV  should  have 
ceased to exist and a new company temporally called " V"  should have had  been created at 
the beginning of 1993. 
Due to the delays in  the implementation of the plan, the creation of this company has been 
postponed and now the target is for it to be operational by the first of January  1995. 
In  order to meet this deadline the following steps have been taken or are in  hand  : 
Definition of the assets to transfer to  the new company; 
the legal conditions for the transfers have been determined; 
negotiations with the creditors of the "dormant" companies have started; 
the group "V"  has been defined by  branches of production activity; 
the updating of the restructuring plan by  independent consultants. 
The new company "V"  is expected to be formally created by mid october 1994. 
By the end of the first quarter 1995  the fmal  structure of the new group "V"  should also be 
completed. C.sJ. 
Flnanci&I.Results 
PLAN VS.ACTUAL 
. mDBons of pesetas 
Operating Results 1 N 
F'IMI)Cial Charges 
Net Results 
.  I 
Operating Results 
F'manciaJ Charges 
Net Results 
Operating Results 
Financial Charges  . 
Net Results 
.  Monlforlng  { 2. 
"donn ant"  "donn ant" 
AHV  ENSIDESA  'V' 
.:.4228  -8915  13432 
-5740  -11560  -14054 
o·  0  . ;.2718 
AHV  ENSIDESA  'V'· 
1160  -7115 
-8922  -:-19555 
-15730  -34945 
IVARIANCEI 
Explanation of difference: 
·  ·  AHV revenue from sale of shares 
AHV foreseen aids 
total 
remaining difference 
ENSIDESA revenue from sale of sh. 
ENSIDESA foreseen aids 
TABL-=1 
.. 
TOTAL 
289 
-31354 
-2718 
TOTAL  ·. 
.0955 
-28477 
~067'6 
TOTAL 
1994· 
6244 
-2877 
47957 
6746 
8872 
20238 
14839 
50695 
-2738 In the fim monitOruig ~the  Commission stateclthat under the plan,· combined 1992.!9J 
losses were forecast to be 11.2 billion pesetas.  This .corilpared with actual losses incurred. or. 
198 billion pesetas. However,  CKir report noted that it was difficult to make  com~sons 
because die by  element of  the p~  (aeandn of  the successor company to AHV  and &Sidesa, . 
wbi~  bad.been due to start operating as from ll'anuaty 1993) bas not yet been implemented. 
.  .  .  ' 
In  following :p this issue With the Spanish authorities, it  bas been found that the Commissi~n 
made an error in  c:aJ~anng  1he forecast losses for 1992 and 1993. The figure quoted shouid · 
have  been  62.4 billion  pesetas.  The basis for this figure,  compared 'with our previous 
calculatiOns, is set oUt at Annex 1.  · 
•. 
· 'Ibe divergence between ~e·  forecast results and actual results (wbidJ.lemaiit unchanged) was 
therefore around 136 blllion pesetas, slightly greater 1ban ilie Commissio~  originally stated. 
However, as previously noted, it needs tO be borne in mind that the actual results are not · 
comparabl~  because of  the non-implementation of the· plan.  Under ~e  plan the 1993 forecast 
~ts  for the donnant Eosidesa and AHV eompaD:ies included aids totalling nearly 84 billion 
pesetas, mosdy in  th~  form of  revenue f;rom'sale of  sha.res ~the  new company.and social aids 
wbidJ. have not been paid.  After taking this into account, there is a remaining difference of • . 
around S2 billion pesetas between the forecast and actual results.  This closely corresponds 
to the additional  aid authorised  amounting to· 53.153  bilUon· pesetas in the form  of loss  .  .-
compensation .to cover' the increased operatiilg losses and financial charges incurred in 1992.  · 
·and 1993. 
.  '  . 
The difference between the forecast and actual results can therefore be attributed to the delays  · 
in the plan's implementation and the associated aid payments.  It is novi expected that the· new  .  · 
company will be established towards the end of  this year and become operational as from 1  . 
January  i995.- "  ·  ·  · 
The higher than forecast losses were covered by the loans and convertible bonds identified in 
the first  monitoring  rei>oit.  From an· examination of the terms  and  conditions of these 
facilities,  and the· associ~te<i state guarantees where applicable,  it appears that no state aid 
elements w:ere involved.  ·  · 
At this stage it is unclear precisely what impact these credit facilities will have on the longer  . 
term viability of  the plan.  We shall be keeping this question under close review in subsequent · 
monitoring  reports.  , The  Commission  understands  that  independent  consultants  will.· be 
reviewing ~d  updating the plan in the light of  the delays and other changes (e.g  .. acceleration . ~  . 
of the Ansio  closure) prior to the establi$nent oft;he new company.·  The Commission .. 
expects 'to receive t,he fullest information on this• to assist it in its monitoring task. J!onieast Net Resai«S uder  CS1 Plan  . 
AllVJEaiidesa .  Dormant 
AHV 
93  92 
Previous  ~~ 
. calc:ulation from  -60812 
6rst mODitoring report 
Comet figures  -86994.  28295 
Variance 
.  . 
. Dormant. 
Bosidesa 
93 
6687  . 
. ADneJC.l. 
New  To~l 
Company  . 
.  93  92+93 
-10408  -71220 
-10408  -62420 
+8800 
•  Previous calaslation was based  on  summary table from  consultants report wbich  · 
coirtained this error. 
.  . 
••  Under the plan 1993 results of  the dormant .AHV and Ensidesa companies also need 
to be taken into account  ·  ·  · - 1 -
Annex 3· 
Monitoring of Article 95 ECSC steel cases 
Second report 
SID  EN  OR 
Introduction 
On 12 April 1994 the Commission authorised aids under Article 95 ECSC totalling 80.052 
billion pesetas, made up as follows: 
up to 26.3 billion pesetas for debt write-offs; 
up to 7. 79 billion pesetas social aids; 
up to 20.2 bilion pesetas in the form of new paid-in capital;  and 
up to 25.762  billion pesetas in the form of loss compensation to cover additional operating 
losses and financial charges in  1992 and  1993. 
Previously the Commission had also approved social aids totalling up to a maximm of 7.79 
billion pesetas as being compatible with Article 4.1  of the Steel Aids Code. 
This second  monitoring report on Sidenor is  based on information contained in the third 
quarterly report by the Spanish authorities, submitted on 15th September 1994 in accordance 
with Commission decision 94/261/ECSC. 
The following analysis by the Commission services also draws on the data provided by the 
Spanish authorities in their second quarterly report of 15th of June 1994, as required under 
the Article 95 decision. 
Outstanding questions remaining from the first monitoring report (SEC(94)903) are covered 
in the relevant sections of this report.  · 
Capacity Reductions 
With the sale of the Larrondo plant (which is reported further below), the production capacity 
of Sidenor has been reduced by  90,000 tons/year in  liquid steel production and by 60,000 
tons/year in hot rolling production. 
This however has no effect on the overall reduction capacities required by the Art. 95 decision 
which had already been achieved during 1993. 
Investments 
No further  investments foreseen  under the  plan have  been performed during the first  six 
months of 1994. 
\2. - 2-
Workforce reduction 
The total workforce of Sidenor at 30.6.94 totalled 2422 people. During the first six months 
of  this year 485 people left the company (29 in the first quarter and 456 in the second quarter 
including 413 transferred to Larrondo); in the same period 65 people were hired, bringing the 
total net workforce reductions since 1991  to 2303 people, 123 above plan. 
Social costs for the first and the second quarter were 849 and 655 millions ptas. respectively, 
bringing the total social costs paid up to now under the restucturing plan to 7.4 billions ptas. 
(all covered by loans). 
Production and Market Effects 
Average monthly production for 1993 and the 1st and 2nd quarter 1994 was as follows: 
OOOs  1993  1st Q.  94  2nd Q. 94  1st Q.94/  2nd Q.94/  1994est./ 
Tonnes  1993  1st Q.94  1993 
' 
Liquid  43.7  53.4  56.4  22.3%  5.5%  14.2% 
steel 
Products 
Special  34.7  44.1  46.1  26.9%  4.6%  18.1% 
Steel  HR 
Stainless  1.8  2.1  2.1  17.7%  0.7%  7.3% 
Steel  HR 
Forge &  31.5  9.3  10.0  18.4%  7.6%  11.7% 
Foundry 
Yearly/  1993  1st Q.  94  2nd Q.  94 
Quarterly 
Totals 
Liquid  524.4  160.3  169.1 
Steel 
HR  438.0  138.5  144.7 
Products 
Forge &  31.5  9.3  10.0 
Foundry 
Sales  during  the  1st  and  2nd  Quarters  of 1994  totalled  111,896  tons  and  170,166  tons 
respectively. If we annualize these figures taking into account seasonal factors the total 1994 
estimated sales are of  the order of 512,000 tons. This forecast compares with previous years' 
sales and those forecast under the plan as follows  : - 3 -
OOOs Tonnes  Actual Sales  Planned Sales  %  variation 
1994 estimated  512  550  (7.0) 
1993  402  516  (22.0) 
1992  439  548  (20.0) 
1991  542  542  -------
The breakdown of sales by market was as follows : 
1992  1993  1st Qtr 94  2nd Qtr 94  1st Half 94 
Spain  53.9%  52.0%  55.9%  57.2%  56.7% 
Other EC  40.7%  38.7%  34.2%  34.5%  34.4% 
Oth. World  5.5%  9.3%  9.9%  8.3%  8.9% 
Total Sales  438932  402168  111896  170166  282062 
(tonnes) 
The domestic share of sales shows a definite increase during the first half of this year mainly 
at the expense sales to other  EC countries. 
According to the average prices reported by the Spanish authorities, there has been an upward 
movement  in prices  throughout  the  first  half of 1994.  The  Commission  services  have 
examined this information and concluded that the prices charged are within the normal range. 
Financial Performance 
After the first monitoring report questions were raised about the viability of the restructuring 
plan for Sidenor given the divergence beween the actual 1993 results and those forecast under 
the plan.  After discussion with the Spanish authorities, due to the relatively small difference 
(6 %) between the actual net results for  1993  ( 42.0 billions ptas.) and the planned results 
(13.8 billions ptas.), after taking into account the compensation aid approved in the Art.  95 
decision to  cover additional losses because of the delay  in the plan implementation (25.8 
billions ptas.), the Commission concluded that no changes to the plan were necessary at that 
stage. 
The Sidenor plan foresaw the. acquisition by  Sidenor of the activities of both Acenor and 
. Foarsa. This should have occurred in 1993. According to the Spanish authorities this operation 
will be performed by the end of 1994. In their view therefore the combined results of Acenor 
and Foarsa at this stage are still not very meaningful for the purposes of  comparison with the 
plan. 
The Commission services  h~ve nevertheless analyzed  the financial  data provided and  will 
continue to take all necessary steps to ensure the conformity of Sidenor's activities with the - 4-
provisions of  the Article 95 Decision. 
The Spanish authorities have reported the following  actua~ results for the first two quarters 
of 1994 which, when annualized, compare as follows with 1993 and the plan for 1994 : 
(M  PTAS)  1st Qtr.  94  2nd Qtr.  94  1993  1994 plan* 
(annualized)  (annuali~d) 
Turnover  44444  48138  3151,4  43953 
Losses  14876  15136  22379  1871 
Net Op. Result.  5000  4830  11667  7340 
Finan. Charges  8420  8776  8523  2951 
Finan. Debts  54804  59997  48301  21719 
•, >lan  fr  ures do not mclude Larrondo  p  g 
The figures for 1994 show improvl!ments compared with the  1993  results especially at the 
level  of losses and  operating results.  However,  indebtedness has increased.  Moreover the 
actual results look set to be substantially worse than those forecast for  1994 under the plan. 
However, a comparison with the planned figures  for  1994 is difficult for two reasons: 
1) Larrondo is not included in the plan forecasts; 
2) Sidenor has not taken over the activities of  Acenor and Foarsa as was planned, as explained 
above. 
Due to the importance of  these differences, the Commission services will have to investigate 
further in order fully to assess the extent of the apparent divergences in the figures and their 
impact on plan viability. 
Aid payments 
No aids were received in the period covered by this report. 
Capitalisations 
In the  first  monitoring report it was  stated that the Commission was seeking clarifications 
from the Spanish authorities about a capital injection of 8.2 billions pesetas into Acenor made 
last Autumn. 
The Spanish authorities confirmed that the capital injection for 8.224 billions ptas. shown in 
the Acenor balance sheet was an anticipation of  the approval of  the restructuring plan and that 
it is part of the 20.2 billions ptas.  aid  in the form of new paid-in capital. 
The schedule for the other capitalisations identified in the first report is not known yet. 
Terms and conditions of new loans - 5 -
In the fJrst monitoring report the Commission identified various loan8· used to cover the higher 
than forecast losses and the delays in aid payment. From an examination of the tenns and 
conditions of  these loans, and the associated State guarantees where applicable, it appears that 
no State aid elements were involved since these were in line with market rates. 
During the first quarter 1994 Sidenor obtained further short term loans for 8. 7 billions ptas. 
from  the majority public shareholders of Acenor and  Foarsa :  INI  and ICO (5.3  and  3.4 
billions  ptas.  respectively).  In  the  same  period  a  loan  for  2.0  billions  ptas.  has  been 
reimbursed. 
During the second quarter 1994 Sidenor obtained from the same majority shareholders, short 
tenn loans for 10.0 billions ptas. : 4.2 INI and 5.8 ICO  (the latter with a State guarantee). 
Short term debts  for 5.5 billions ptas. have been reimbursed during the same period. 
The loans without guarantee appear to  be at market conditions, while the loan with a state 
guarantee  will  require  further  investigation  to  determine  whether or not  it contains  any 
element of aid.  The Commission will also examine to  what extent the resulting increase in 
financial charges is likely to affect viability. 
Privatisations 
On the 3rd of May 1994, the Sidenor's Board of Directors approved thesale of  the Larrondo 
plant  to  the  private  consortium  formed  by  the  Basque  group  Digeco  and  Clorimax,  a 
subsidiary of the Italian steel group Roda.  This decision concluded an open bid procedure 
started in 1992. 
The sale was authorized by the Spanish Goverrunent in the month of July 1994. 
The price was  100 millions  ptas.  free  of any  charge, mortgage,  guarantee,  limitations and 
encumbrances of any kind. 
The starting balance sheet for the company "Aceros Inoxidables Olarra S.A." is as follows: 
Assets 
Fixed Assets 
Stocks 
Cash 
Credits 
Total Assets 
Liabilities 
Net brought in capital 
Provisions 
Public Debts 
Total Liabilities 
3,168,150,925 
1,679,360,276 
740,000,000 
700,000,000 
6,287,511 ,201  pesetas 
950,805,000 
139,195,000 
5,197,511,201 
6,287,511 ,20 I pesetas - 6-
The Commission will be examining this sale in more detail to establish the possible impact 
of  the transfer of  debts to the new company on the level of  aid authorised for debt write-offs. 
The Spanish autorities also reported with reference to this sale that it was agreed between the 
buyer and the seller that social costs to reduce the workforce from 413 people to 320 will be 
borne by Acenor.  These costs will amount to 1.3  billions ptas. 
The Commission will be seeking more information on this aspect to determine the possible 
impact on the approved social aids, since the level for these was based on the assumption that 
Larrondo woud be closed down with the loss of all 413 jobs. Monitoring of Article 95 ECSC steel cases  ANNEX  4 
Second Report 
ILVA 
Introduction 
On  12  April  1994 the Commission authorised  aids  under  Article 95  ECSC  totalling 4790 
billions lit.  in the following forms  : 
write-off of residual debt up to a maximum of 2943  billions lit. after sale of assets 
coverage by IRI of restructuring and liquidation expenditures of up to a maximum of 
1197 billions lit. 
capital injection by  IRI of 650 billions lit. 
This second monitoring report on ILVA is based on the information submitted by the Italian 
authorities on  15th September 1994 in accordance with  Commission decision 94/259/ECSC. 
Since as of the  1.1.94 the group Ilva was split in three distinct entities ( ILP, AST and Ilva 
in  Liquidazione )  in some cases the Commission's analysis will  treat them  separately and 
whenever possible reference will be made to the past situation. 
Outstanding questions remaining from the first monitoring report are covered in the relevant 
sections of this report. 
Capacity  reductions 
Ilva in Liquidazione.  The dismantling of  the Bagnoli  rolling mill started on 30.6.94. 
Negotiations for the sale of this equipment are under way with parties outside of the 
Community.The schedule for dismantling will  be done in accordance with the needs 
of the future buyer. 
The Commission services will follow very closely these developments. 
ILP.  On 30.6.94 the reheating furnaces  for the heavy plate and for the hot- rolled 
wide strip n·  I  mill  were  disactivated and  the dismantling operations started. 
These  operations  include  the  removal  of the  burners  and  the  dismantling or  the 
charging and  discharging equipment.  This  phase of the dismantling operations was 
concluded by the end of August 1994. 
The result of these operations is  the reduction of the Taranto production capacity of 
1.2 millions tonnes as required in the art.  95  decision. 
Investments 
Investments of general maintenance or investments aimed at environmental or technological 
improvements, were foreseen both by ILP and AST as reported in the first monitoring report. 
At  the  30.6.94,  ILP  had  undertaken  expenditures  of 35.5  billion  lit.  out of the  foreseen investments of 571  billions lit.;  AST,  at the same date, had spent 5.6 billions lit.  out of the 
46.8 foreseen. 
Financing of these investments was done from resources. 
Workforce reductions 
Workforce reductions for the group Ilva are summarized in table I . 
During the first six  months of 1994 Jlva in Liquidazione dismissed 491  people. 
Additional people should be made redundant during the course of  this year in accordance with 
the plan. 
Ilva management is waiting the issuing by the Italian Authorities of  the appropriate legislation 
that will  regulate the  departure in  preretirement of workers in  the public and  private steel 
industry. 
The workforce reductions due to closures that had been notified to the Commission in January 
1994, will also be subject to this new legislation. Social aid for these closure reductions is to 
be covered by aids under art.  4{1) of the Steel Aid Code and under the art. 95 Decision. 
Due to these changes in the legislation, the Commission is waiting for further information in 
order to examine the notified aids in the light of the new situation. 
Production &  Sales 
Production  and  sales  levels  of ILP  and  AST  only  are  covered  by  this  report  since  the 
corresponding data for  the other companies left in Ilva in Liquidazione relate mainly to non 
ECSC products. 
Production 
ILP  Production figures are reported in  table II. 
Liquid steel  and  hot rolled products show a small  increase in  the first half 1994 vs. 
the same period of last year : 1. 7% for both. 
The yearly trend is 6.7% above plan for liquid steel production and 6.6% under plan 
for coils production. 
AST  Production figures are reported in table III. 
Sales 
First half 1994liquid steel production was 16% above the level of the corresponding 
1993  period.  The yearly trend is 2.6 % above plan. 
Hot rolled stailess steel  production was  10%  higher than the production during the 
same period last year.  The yearly trend is 5.9 % above plan. 
ILP  First half 1994 sales of  finished products totalled 3.8 millions tons up 1.7% compared 
with the same period 1993. 
The trend of sales is in line with the planned sales at the end of the year. 
The split by  market is  : 1992  1993  1st Half 1993  1st Half 1994 
Italy  71.8%  66.8%  66.7%  69.4% 
Other EC  13.9%  13.8%  12.5%  15.0% 
Third  14.3%  19.5%  20.8%  15.6% 
Countries 
OOOs  tonnes  6,986  7,015  3,733  3,798 
Data for the second  half 1994 show a strengthening on  the domestic market and  in 
other EC markets  with a corresponding decrease in the other world markets. 
Reported prices for the first half 1994 are from  10 to 20 % higher than those in the 
1993  corresponding  period  in  almost  all  products.  The Commission  services  have 
examined this information and concluded that the prices charged are within the normal 
range. 
AST  Sales for the first half 1994 totalled 423.2 thousands tonnes with an increase ofl9.6% 
over the same period in  1993.  The split by  market was as follows : 
1993  l st Half 1994 
.Italy  60.8%  64.7% 
Other EC + EFT  A  15.8%  14.6% 
Third Countries  23.4%  20.7% 
OOOs  tonnes  683.2  423.2 
Data for  the  first  half 1994  show  a  strengthening  in  the  domestic  market  and  a 
decrease in exports. 
Reported prices  for stainless steels show decreases of the order of 4 to 12  % mainly 
in the austenitic steels. 
The Commission  services  have  examined  this  information  and  concluded  that  the 
prices charged are within the normal  range. 
Financial performance 
Questions outstanding from the first monitoring report included ILP and AST ratios between 
financial charges and turnover at the outset of the companies. 
Upon reception of more detailed information it can be stated that the above mentioned ratios 
at the beginning of the year were as  follows : ILP  3.5%  with a 1993 turnover of 7898 billions lit and financial charges for 274 billion 
lit. 
AST: 4.4%  with a 1993 turnover of 1524 billions lit. and financial charges for 67 billions 
lit. 
The  condition on financial  charges  specified  in  the  art.  95  Decision  have  therefore  been 
fulfilled. 
The need for an examination of loans obtained during  1993  was also identified. 
Since the first monitoring report detailed  information have been obtained about these loans 
and  their  conditions;  although the  analysis of these  data has  not yet  been completed,  no 
indication has so far been found that the  loans were not provided under market conditions. 
The financial data received with the second monitoring report refers to the three companies 
separately,  therefore in  many  instances it  is  impossible to  compare the  figures  with those 
reported in the first report. The comparison has been done wherever it was possible. 
llva in liquidazione 
The structure of this company having significantly changed since the spinning off of the two 
other companies, it is  not possible to  compare previous economic results with those for the 
first half 1994, however, 
turnover for the first half of 1994 was 1439 billions lit. and the forecast until 
the end of the year is 2639 billions lit.  ( a comparable figure for  1993 would 
be 2187 billions lit.); 
losses for the first half of 1994 were 659 billions lit.  and they are forecast to 
reach 1091  billions lit by year end.  1993  losses of Ilva in Liquidazione at the 
end of  the year included also ILP and AST; therefore they are not comparable. 
financial charges, for the same period were 223 billions lit. or 15.5 %of the 
turnover. 
Indebtedness 
In accordance with the art.  95  Decision, Ilva is entitled to receive aid to cover 
indebtedness up to a maximum of 2943 billions lit. This aid, together with the 
income received from the sales of the companies being privatized, is intended 
to cover a total indebtedness of I 0067 billions lit. less the debts transferred to 
the  companies  being  sold,  estimated  to  be  2958  billions  lit.  at  31.12.93. 
Additional aid up to 750 billions lit.  can be allowed as compensation if lower 
than forecast receipts are obtained from  the sales. 
The  net  financial  debts  as  reported  by  the  Italian  authorities  in  their  two 
reports,  have  been adjusted to  make  them  comparable with the plan figures 
(this exercise has altered the  presentation of the figures  reported in the first 
monitoring report, but not the substance). 
The results are shown in table IV.  The following variations can be detected : Plan  1st Monitoring  2nd Monitoring 
Report  Report 
Situation at  :  31112/93  estimated  31/12/93  30/6/94 
Total comparable  10067  10251  11378 
Indebtedness 
Variation from plan  0  184  1311 
% 
ILP 
0  1.8  13.0 
The small variation from  the plan at the end of last year is now increased to 
13  % at the end of the first half. 
According to the Italian Authorities the increase of the indebtedness is due to 
increases in interest rates.  More  details have already  been requested  by the 
Commission from the Italian Authorities so that investigations can be carried 
out with regard to the causes and the financing of this situation. 
In Table V an attempt is made to estimate the amout of  aid needed taking into 
account the  realized  transfer of debts,  an  estimate of the  debts  still  to  be 
transferred and again an estimate of the receipts to be obtained from the sale 
of the companies being privatized. 
As  can  be  seen,  actual  transfers  of debts  to  ILP  and  AST  higher  than 
forecasted in the plan, had  decreased the amount of  aid needed as of  the final 
results for 1993. However, the high amount of debts inr.urred in the first half 
of this year, even if offset in some extent by the debts transferred to Cogne, 
has increased to the maximun the level of  aid needed to cover the indebtedness 
of Ilva .. 
For ILP and AST the level of indebtedness used for the Commission analysis 
is that at the moment these companies were set up. 
turnover for  the  first  half 1994  was  4676  billions  lit.  and  is  forecast to  be 
8568 billions lit. at the end of the year, an increase of.approx. 25 % over plan; 
estimated  1993  turnover was 7898 billions lit.; 
operating results of 396 and 624 billions lit. for the first half 1994 and as a 
forecast  for  year  1994  as  a  whole  respectively,  show an  increase  over the 
planned results (  17.5 % for  1994  ); 
net  results  for  the  first  half of 1994  were  219  billions  lit.  and  they  are 
expected to increase to 316 biUion lit. by the end of the year ( 4. 7 % and 3. 7 
% of turnover respectively); 
financial charges for the first six months of 1994 were 117 billions lit. and 
due to the  increased turnover and lowering interest rates they now represent 
only 2.5 %of the turnover versus the 3.5 %at the outset of the company; AST 
indebtedness of the company after six months of operations shows a decrease 
mainly in short term debts (1067 billion lit. vs.  1169 billion lit. at the begining 
of the year : 8.7% decrease); 
forecasted total indebtedness for the year is higher than planned (1813 billion 
lit.  vs.  1609  billion  lit.  in  the  plan)  because  ILP  started  with  higher  than 
planned debts (1886 billion lit. vs.  1312 billion lit.). 
turnover for the first half of 1994 is 904  billions lit.  and the forecast for the 
year is  1690 billions lit or 9.6% over plan;estimated 1993  turnover was 1524 
billions lit.;  · 
operating  results  are  45  billions  for  the  first  six  months  of  1994  and 
forecasted to reach  l 00 billions by the end of the year or a decrease vs.  plan 
of  12 %; 
net results for the first semester 1994 were 17.2 billion lit. ( 1. 9 % of  turnover) 
and are forecasted to increase to 38.9 billion lit.  (2.3  % of turnover) by year 
end. 
financial charges during the first half of 1994 were 22.9 billions lit and the 
forecast for the year is  46 billions lit.; which represent 2.5  % of turnover at 
30.6.94 and 2.7% at the end of the year; 
indebtedness of the company which was 536 billions at the beginning of the 
year was 485 billions at the 30.6.94 and it is expected to stay at the same level 
until the end of 1994; planned figures were 336 billions lit and 340 billions lit 
at the beginning and at the end of the year respectively. 
Aid payments 
No aids were received in  the period covered by  this report. 
Terms and conditions of new loans 
ILP and AST have not contracted any  new loans during the first six months of 1994. 
As  regards  Ilva  in  liquidazione,  the  Commission,  as  already  stated  above,  has  requested 
further  information on  the  amourit of loans obtained during the first  six  months of 1994. 
These  data,  together  with  those  already  provided  for  last  year,  will  constitute  a  matter 
requiring a global  and thorough verification in  the coming weeks  .. 
Privatisations 
During the year 1994 the following privatisations were performed : 
Cogne.  This  company  was  sold  on  1.1.94,  after  the  conclusion  of an  open  bid 
procedure,  to Geval (Gestioni Valdostanne sri) of the private group Marzorati for 100 
% of its capital  at a price of 7 billions lit.  The financial  debts transferred from  Ilva 
in  liquidazione were 75  billions lit. AST. On  1.1.94 this company was created and an open bid procedure started to sell 
100 % of its capital. The Commission has examined this procedure and concluded that 
each potential bidder had access to the same information and was required to meet the 
same conditions in  the time scale and thus met the Commission's equirements.  The 
open bid procedure was closed on  13.5.94. On 30.6.95, Ilva's only  shareholder IRI 
declared the KAI consortium (Krupp-Thyssen,Riva,F  alck, Tedfin) winner of  the bid and 
on  14.7.94 a sale contract was signed. 
The price was 600 billion lit.  (or 200 billions more than forecasted).  The buyer also 
took over 500 billion lit.  of debts instead of the 474 billion lit. foreseen by the plan. 
The Commission received complete notification of this sale on the 2 I st of september 
1994  and. this  is  now  under  examination  to  see if it is  in  line  with  the  Merger 
Regulations and with the related competition Articles of the ECSC Treaty. 
ILP .  On the 1.1. 94 the ILP company was created  and an open bid procedure started 
for the sale of 100% of its capital. 
At the closing of the procedure, no bid qualified according to the rules of the bidding 
process.  IRI,  therefore,  closed  the  procedure  and  continued  with  individual 
negotiations which are still under way. 
Since according to the Decision 94/259 /ECSC the privatisation of this company has 
to be achieved by  the 31.12.94, the Commission,  on the 16th of September  1994, 
asked the Italian Authorities for more information on the status of this privatisation. 
Negotiations are also underway for the sale of the following companies : 
ISE 
Dalmine 
Dalmine Resine 
ICMI 
TDI 
Saster 
Ilvanetwork 
Finally, it is worth to recalling that as  far as  ILP and AST are concerned, the .Commission 
will continue to monitor them in  accordance with the requirements of the art.  95 Decision as 
long  as  their privatisations  have  not  been  finalized.  Once privatisation  happens,  and  it  is 
estabilished  to  be in  line  with  the Decision,  these  companies  will  no  longer  need  to  be 
monitored. ILVA  Monitoring /2  TABLE I 
Workforce Reductions 
PLANNED 
Workforce at : 
31/12192  31/12193  By:  31/12/96 
40562  39427  11500 people will be dismissed 
Var.->  1135  of  which: 
16450 ILVA in Uq.  4200 at ILP & AST 
18520 ILP  1920 at other  companies to be 
4457 AST  sold 
229n ILP+AST  5380 in CIG at 31112193 
Of which  CIG : 
4935  5380  5380 
ACTUAL::  dismissals 
Workforce at :  since 1992 
31/12192  31/12193  111194  3016194  to date : 
40562  38613  38613  38122 
Var.->  1949  >  491  2440 
ILVAin Liq.  15939  14646 
ILP  18219  18219 
AST  4455  4455 
ILP+AST  22674  22674 
COGNE  802 ILVA  Monitoring /2 
PRODUCTION 
thousandstonnes 
ILP  ILP  TABLE II 
PLANNED  ACTUAL  .. 
1993  1994  1995  1996  1992  1993  1st Half 93  1st Half 94  1994 est 
Pig Iron  8400  7880  8315  8315  Pig Iron  7808  8203  4373  4348  8156 
Liquid Steel  8600  7865  8210  8210  Liquid Steel  '7843  8252  4441  4515  8390 
Wide Strip  6000  6400  6365  6365  Wide Strip  6361  5878  3331  3388  5979 
Heavy Plate  1060  1005  1080  1080  Heavy Plate  1074  . 1020  566  594  1070 
ACTUAL VS. PLANNED  ACTUAL VS. PREVIOUS 
.19a3.  1st Half 94  1994 est. 
1993  1994 est.  1995  1996  1992  1st Half 93 
Pig Iron  (2.3)  3.5 
Liquid Steel  (4.0)  6.7 
Wide Strip  (2.0)  (6.6) 
Heavy Plate  (3.8)  6.5 
Note  : 
These figures give the picture of production as it  was planned and 
as it is now reported by the Italian authorities. 
Pig Iron  5.1 
Liquid Steel  5.2 
Wide Strip  (7.6) 
Heavy Plate  (5.0) 
Yearly estimates are from Commission services based on 1993 taking Into account seasonal factors. 
The Commission will be asking the Italian authorities questions about variations from the plan. 
(0.6) 
1.7 
1.7 
4.9 
1993 
(0.6) 
1.7 
1.7 
4.9 ILVA  Monitoring I 2 
PRODUCllON 
thousands tonnes 
TABLE Ill 
AST  AST 
PLANNED  ACTUAL  .. 
1993  1994  1995  1996  1992  1993  1st Half 93  1st Half 94  1994 esl 
Liquid Steel  827  917  926  980  Liquid Steel  775  811  430  499  941 
HR wide stri  855  846  855  907  HR wide stri  1042  860  477  497  896 
CR sheet  471  477  486  495  CRsheet  448  463  245  271  512' 
Stainless  :  376  375  365  410  Stainless  :  341  353  198  206  369 
HR  70  65  50  90  HR  53  70  43  35  57 
CR  306  310  315  320  CR  288  283  155  171  312 
ACTUALVS.PLANNED  ACTUAL VS. PREVIOUS 
1.9.93.  1st Half 94  1994 est. 
1993  1994 est.  1995  1996 
Liquid Steel  (1.9)  2.6 
HR wide stri  0.6  5.9 
CR sheet  {1.7)  7.4 
Stainless  :  (6.1)  (1.5) 
HR  0.0  (12.3) 
CR  {7.5)  0.7 
Note  : 
These figures give the picture of production as it was planned and 
as it  is now reported by the Italian authorities. 
1992  1st Half93 
Liquid Steel  .  4.6  16.0 
HR wide stri  (17.5}  4.2 
CRsheet  3.3  10.6 
Stainless  :  3.5  4.0 
HR  32.1  (18.6) 
CR  (1.7)  10.3 
Yearly estimates are from Commission services based on 1993 taking Into account seasonal factors. 
The Commission will be asking the Italian authorities questions about variations from the plan. 
1993 
16.0 
4.2 
10.6 
4.6 
(18.6) 
10.3 ILVA  Monltortng /2 
llva Indebtedness  TABLE  IV 
. Reconciliation with the plan  f.lln  1st  Report  2nd Report 
(figures provided are in bold) 
Situation at  •  31/12193 est.  31/12193  30/6194 
billions lit. 
Totallndebtedness  10067  8114  9.166 
Debts transferred  o  2137  2212 
Total comparable Indebtedness  10067  10251  11378 
Variation from plan  184  1127 
Estimation of  needed aid 
(figures provided are in bold) 
Situation at 
billions lit. 
Total comparable Indebtedness 
Debts to be transferred  : 
ILP 
AST 
Sofinpar 
Cogne and Others 
Total Debts to be transferred 
Total remgining indebtedness 
Estimated income from sales 
ofwhich  : 
ILP 
AST 
Sofinpar 
Others 
Other net incomes/{  costs) 
Aid needed to cover Indebtedness 
Variation from plan 
NOTE 
Aid foreseen by the plan 
31/12/93 est. 
10067 
1298 
474 
125 
.1061 
2958. 
7109 
4166 
1300 
400 
1106 
1425 
-65 
2943 
0 
Aid to cover indebtedness  2943 
Aid for restructuring & liquidation  11iZ 
1st  Report 
31/12/93 
10251 
1701 
436 
125 
1001 
3323 
6928 
4166 
1300 
400 
1106 
1425 
-65 
2762 
-181 
Total indebt. to be covered by IRI  4140  + 750 billions • 
capital injection  650 
Total aid foreseen bythe plan  4790 
TABLE  V 
2nd Report 
30/6/94 
11378 
1701 
436 
125 
10.61 
3323 
8055 
4366 
1300 
600 
1106 
1425 
-65 
3689 
746 
• Under the art. 95 Decision, llva is entitled to an additional amount up to 750 billions lit 
"if the revenue received from the sale of  the undertakings concerned is less than the 
amounts anticipated". Second Report 
I.  Introduction 
Monitoring of Article 95 ECSC steel cases 
Siderurgia Nacional, Portugal 
Annex 5 
The Commission  decided  on  12  April  1994  to  approve  aids  totalling  60.12 bn Esc  under 
Article 95 ECSC Treaty
1 (303 MECU) of which  38 bn Esc (191.5 MECU) are earmarked for a 
capital injection and 22.12 bn Esc (111  MECU) for debt write-off.  The Commission approved 
in  September 1994 social and environmental aids of 5.925 bn Esc (30.06 MECU) under the 
Steel Aids Code
2
. 
The present report covers some outstanding questions from the first monitoring report that had 
been discussed with the Portugese Government in the meantime and the information provided 
by  the  Portugese  Government  in  its  second  monitoring  report,  which  was  submitted  on 
15 September 1994. 
11.  Outstanding questions from the first monitoring report 
In its first monitoring report, the Commission identified two issues of concern: the deteriorating 
financial performance of the company compared to that forecasted under the plan and some 
discrepancies between the report of the Portugese Government and the information provided 
by the responsible Directorate General concerning ECSC loans granted to Siderurgia Nacionat 
(SN).  The Commission has followed up these issues with the Portugese authorities. 
Regarding  the  first  question,  the  Portugese  Government  was  of  the  opinion  that  the 
deteriorating financial performance should not cause too much concern since it was purely due 
to a very weak market in 1993, which all steel undertakings had to suffer.  The !':>recasts under 
the plan  had been based on  the assumption of an earlier implementation of tr•e  restructuring 
plan  than  had proved  possible.  It is  intended  to  examine  these questions en  the basis of 
figures covering the first half of 1994.  The Portugese Government presented a full range of 
key  financial ratios covering this period  in  its report submitted on  15 September 1994.  The 
detailed examination and discussion of these figures will take place  shortly. 
The second question concerned  some  discrepancies between  the  information given by  the 
Portugese  Government  and  the  information  available  to  the  responsible  services  of the 
Commission on  ECSC loans granted to  SN  when  the first monitoring  report was  examined. 
Following discussions it emerged that the discrepancies arose from the fact that the Portugese 
Government presented loans of the ECSC as already granted while they were de facto only 
agreed but not forwarded at that time. 
The Commission also questioned the exact nature of several Carta de Conforto granted by the 
Portugese  Government in  order to  allow financing  to  be  raised  in  the  market.  They were 
explained  as  a  guarantee  to  pay  the  intended  aid  once  it  would  be  approved  by  the 
Commission.  It is still to be examined whether these Carta de  Conforto as to the purpose of 
the financing concerned are to be replaced by already approved aid. 
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Ill.  The new monitoring report 
The Portugese Government presented a full range of information in line with the request of the 
Commission.  It also submitted a copy of the Annual Report of Siderurgia Nacional covering 
the year 1993. 
1.  Capacity reductions 
The production of the light section mill and  the continuous casting installations (Seixal)  had 
been stopped by 31  October 1993.  These measures provided the first part (60 ktly) of  the total 
capacity reduction required (140 ktly).  Negotiations to sell the installations to a third country 
are still not completed. 
It is intended, in  line with the Commission's decision and the restructuring plan, to close down 
the medium section mill (Seixal) by 31  December 1995.  This measure would lead to a further 
capacity reduction by 80 ktly thus completing the total capacity reduction required. 
2.  Investments 
The company spent 279.2 mio Esc on small maintenance measures.  The company started to 
prepare the  Master Plan  for the  investment in  a  new electric arc furnace  with  a  German 
consortium that has been chosen after an open tender procedure. 
The  Portugese  Government submitted  a  provisional  investment  plan  that  provides  for  the 
completion  of the  investment  in  the  electric  arc  furnace  in  mid  1996  with  a  subsequent 
experimental and introductory phase of 6 months.  This timetable is,  in its main elements,  in 
line with the business plan submitted in 1993.  The continuous casting installation in Maia will 
be  installed in  1995, with a subsequent experimental and implementation phase up until mid 
1996.  This time table shows a 6 months delay compared to the business plan submitted in 
1993.  It is to be examined whether this delay will have an impact on viability of the company. 
The environmental investments are intended to be carried out in 1995 (40%) and 1996 (60%). 
The  related  environmental  aid  of up  to  1.0  bn  Esc  was  approved  by  the  Commission  in 
September 1994. 
The total costs of investments as in the plan are estimated as follows: 
Technological investments and maintenance  13.65bn Esc 
Environmental investments  5.30bn Esc 
Commercial investments  1.70bn Esc 
TOTAL  20.65bn Esc 
There is an increase in costs for environmental investments due to a reevaluation carried out, 
which is balanced by a reduction in commercial investments. - 3-
3.  Reduction of workforce 
Redundancies 
1993  1994  1994  1995*  1996* 
1. half  2. half* 
early retirement  138  59 
releases  28  8 
other  27  13 
TOTAL  193  80  300  635  590 
forecast 
Forecast of evolution of workforce 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
long products, of which in 
Seixal  2070  2056  455  455  580  580 
in  Maia  478  429  420  420  380  380 
TOTAL long products  2548  2485  875  875  960  960 
flat products  660  530  485  440  440  440 
TOTAL  3208  3015  1360  1315  1400  1400 
SN Services *  - - 1235  465 
SNSGPS ..  - - 40  40  10  '  10 
TOTALSN  3208  3015  2635  2000  1410  1410 
Reduction per year  193  380  635  590  0 
Total planned before  3208  2925  2380  1682  1410  1410 
Deviation from previous plan  - + 90  + 255  + 318  +1-0  +1- 0 
*  The newly created service company, see 111.7.  · 
**  The holding for all3 companies created to prepare privatizationof  SN. 
It shall be noted that the current forecast for the evolution of workforce deviates remarkably 
from the previous business plan submitted by the Portugese Government.  The retention of 
255 employees more in 1994 and 318 employees more in 1995 would cause costs that were 
not expected when the  business plan was drafted.  It is to be examined whether such 
deviation will affect viability of the company. 
Financing of redundancies 1993 
nature  no of  56 ECSC  State*  company  TOTAL 
workers 
early ret.  138  52.8  52.8  - 105.6 
releases  28  17.1  17.1  8.3  42.5 
others  27  - - - -
TOTAL  193  69.9  69.9  8.3  148.1 - 4-
Financing of redundancies 1994 
nature  no. of  56ECSC  State•  company  TOTAL 
worl<ers 
early retir.  59  23.2  23.2  - 46.4 
releases  8  4.7  4.7  6.5  15.9 
others  13  - - - -
TOTAL  80  27.9  27.9  6.5  62.3 
costs in mio Esc 
•state contribution  matched to Article 56 ECSC means. 
4.  Production 
Product  TOTAL1. half1993  TOTAL 2. half 1993  TOTAL 1. half 1994 
Crude steel  382.6  362.7  309.5 
long products  369.7  340.2  318.9 
flat products  110.3  99.4  106.5 
Total finished  480.0  439.6  425.4 
products 
in kt/month 
The company had to deal with some technical problems in the electric arc furnace in  Maia, resulting in 
a lower production of crude steel in January- April1994.  · 
5.  Sales 
1993  1. half 1994 
Portugal  70% =  653 kt  74.35 % =  296.6 kt 
EU  11  12% =  112 kt  14.89% = 59.4 kt 
3rd Countries  18% =  168 kt  10.76% =  42.9 kt 
total  100% =  933 kt  100% =  398.9 kt 
Comparison to forecasts 
deliveries in  reported  forecast  deviation 
kt 
1993  933  1013  -80 
1994  797.8  1004  -206.2 
extrapolation • 5. 
The comparison between the sales reported and the forecasts of the business plan show a significant 
deviation.  The extrapolation of the sales figures of the first half of 1994 may be misleading because the 
company suffered some technological problems during that period which might have resulted in lower 
sales as well.  However, it shall be examined whether the deviations would affect the viability prospects 
of the company. 
The Portugese Government also provided detailed information concerning  pricing.  The Commission 
examined the infonnation given and concluded that the prices are within the normal range. 
6.  Financial Performance 
The company improved its financial performance slightly compared to the situation at the end of 1993 
(the main  financial  ratio turnover/profit improved from  - 45.54 to  - 32. 7),  but did  not attain business 
results that were to be expected according to previous studies(· 26.7).  The business plan submitted 
by the Portugese Government in 1993 foresaw a small net profit of 0.1  bn Esc in 1994.  During the first 
half of 1994, the company already suffered operating losses of 7.86 bn Esc.  According to the Portugese 
Government, the deviation was caused by the weak steel market which affected every European steel 
company and the fact that the implementation of the restructuring plan started later than expected when 
setting up the business plan.  This explanation shall have to be discussed in  detail.  The question of 
whether or not it would be  necessary to require  appropriate measures to reinforce the restructuring 
measures may also be considered. 
7.  Privatization 
Regarding privatization, the Portugese Government informed the Commission that the creation of three 
separate  companies  (SN  Pianos,  SN  Longos  and  SN  Services)  under the  holding  SN  SPGS was 
completed by 31.3.1994.  It expects a privatization of SN Pianos and SN Longos during the second half 
of 1994.  The  announcement  of  the  pr·ivatizat.ion  pt·ogramme  of  SN  should  reinfo•·ce 
the  credibility of  the  financial  restructuring of  the  company. 
8.  Aid 
The Commission approved aids of up to 38 bn Esc (191.5 MECU) for capital injection and 22.12 bn Esc 
(111  MECU)  for debt write-off under Article  95  ECSC.  The  Portugese  Government informed  the 
Commission  that  SN  received  until  30 June 1994  50 bn  Esc  for  its  financial  restructuring.  This 
represents 83% of the aid approved by the Commission under Article 95 ECSC. Second Report 
MonlfO~ng  of  Mtcle 85 ECSC ...  -.ca8e8_ .• · 
·  EKO stahl GmbH, Gennany 
In May 1994, the Riva group withdrew from the privatization contract.  Treuhandanstalt (THA) decided 
that EKO Stahl. should continue nonnal operations and Initiated talks to find a new purohaser for the 
company .. 
.  . 
The Commission decided on 6 July 1994 to Initiate the plocedure provided for In Article 6.4 Steel Aids 
Code With respect to the financing of  EKO stahl by THA.  On27 July 1994,1t Initiated proceedings with 
respect to the Intention. of the Gennan Government to .arant Investment aid¢  up to 300 Mio DM under 
general regional Investment aid schemes.  " 
·In vlew of  the Interruption of  the restructuring efforts caused by Rlva's withdrawal and the continuing 
negotiations with posSible ·purchasers the German Government did not submit a monitoring report on 
EKO Stahl GmbH.  . . 
It  is expectec1 to receive up to date infonnation on the company's situation together With the notification 
of  the new privatizatiori concept. probably fn October.  · Annex 7 
Monitoring of Article 95 ECSC decisions 
Sichsische Edelstahlwerke GmbH, Freitai/Sachsen 
I.  Introduction 
The Commission decided on 12 April 1994 to approve aids totalling 27  4 Mio OM in favour 
of sachsische Edelstahlwerke GmbH, FreitaVSachsen under Article 95 ECSC Treaty'. 
The present report covers  some outstanding questions from  the  first monitoring  report 
which  had  been  discussed  with  the  German  Government  in  the  meantime;  and  the 
information provided by the German Government in its second monitoring report, which was 
submitted on 14 September 1994. 
II.  Outstanding questions from the first monitoring report 
In its monitoring reports covering the period up until end  1993, the Commission identified 
two issues of concern regarding SEW Freital: 
1.  Excess aid 
In  its  first  monitoring  report,  the  Commission  calculated,  based  on  information 
provided  by  the  German  Government,  a  total  amount  of loss  compensation  of 
200 Mio OM, while only 189 Mio OM were approved by the Commission's Decision 
of 12 April1994. 
a)  The explanation of the German Government 
After discussions with the German Government, the position can be explained 
as follows: 
The Commission approved 189 Mio OM loss compensation for the period up 
until 1.1.1993 and a max. 9 Mio OM guarantee of THA covering the existence 
of a certain amount of claims of SEW Freital and  the value of the  existing 
stocks.  THA guaranteed that the stocks would amount to 64 Mio DM and the 
claims would amount to 33.8 Mio OM  at 1.1.1993.  In case the value of the 
stock  and  the  claims  proved  to  be  lower,  THA would  have  to  cover  the 
difference up to 9 Mio OM. 
The German Government informed the Commission that this guarantee was 
only used to cover 2.9 Mio OM.  The stock, however, was increased before 
1.1.1993 by  a value of at  feast 6.1  Mio OM  under the responsibility  of the 
management  provided  by  BoschgotthardtshOtte,  the  purchaser.  These 
purchases were financed by debts, so that the estimated 189 Mio OM  debts 
increased by this amount.  If the stocks would not have been increased, THA 
would have had to pay 6.1  Mio OM more than was finally paid on the basis of 
the above guarantee.  According to the German Government, 6.1  mio OM of 
the total loss compensation as presented by the German Government in its 
first monitoring report should consequently be treated as part of the 9 Mio OM 
guarantee.  loss compensation and  the guarantee for a certain value of the 
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present  stock  on  1.1.1993  are  economically  interconnected  so  that  both 
elements could be taken together. 
In  addition,  the German Government explained that a part,  amounting to  at 
least 5 Mio OM, of the total amount of 200 Mio OM cannot be regarded as aid 
because it represents the purchase price THA would have had to pay for land 
of SEW Freital under the privatization contract. 
THA  decided  to  transfer  the  company  with  the  land  that  would  not  be 
necessary for its operations but with the right and the obligation to re-purchase 
this land.  This is in line with normal privatization practice of THA.  It was not 
possible to transfer the land  to THA before privatization because the exact 
areas  had  first  to  be  defined  and  registered  in  the  public  records.  The 
necessary  procedures  last  some  time  due  to  insufficient  administrative 
capacities in  the territory of the former GDR and particular difficulties in any 
land transfer arising from the law concerning restitution.  · 
Consequently, it was agreed in the privatization contract that THA would have 
to pay  the market value,  assessed by  independent experts,  of the land not 
necessary  for  the  company's  operations.  Although  the  definition  of areas 
affected by this agreement is not yet terminated, it is, according to the German 
Government,  clear that a minimum amount of 5 Mio DM  would  have to  be 
treated as  purch~se price for land.  This amount would not represent State 
aid. 
The total  amount of 6.1  Mio OM  plus  5 Mio OM  would  cover the  apparent 
excess aid of 11  Mio OM,  so that the German Government is of the opinion 
that there is no deviation from what was approved. 
b)  Appraisal 
The Commission will  be  examining the details of the facts explained by  the 
German Government in particular in order to ensure that the interconnection 
between guarantee and loss compensation was really as presented. 
The  information  concerning  the  implementation  of  the  land  purchase 
agreement  is  still  rather  incomplete  because  necessary  procedures  are, 
according to the German Government, still pending.  A final conclusion of the 
Commission that an amount of 5 Mio OM of the total amount of 200 Mio OM 
presented  in  the  first monitoring  report should  not be  regarded  as  aid  can 
therefore only be taken after a close examination of the facts, in particular the 
setting  of the  purchase  price  to  be  paid  by  THA,  taking  into  account  the 
Commission's  general  approach  in  the  field  of State aid  and  land  transfer 
contracts between the State and particular companies. 
2.  Minimum financial charges 
In its first monitoring report, the Commission concluded that the net financial charges 
of SEW Freital would  not  comply  with  the  condition  in  Article  3 (1)  of its  April 
Decision (minimum 3.5%). - 3  -
a)  The position of the German Government 
During the subsequent discussions with the German Government, the latter 
explained  that the privatization  and  restructuring  concept was designed  to 
transfer the shares of the company to the private purchaser after a complete 
privatisation with the obligation of the purchaser to carry out an investment 
programme  which  would  lead  de  facto  to  the  complete  renewal  of  the 
company's installations. 
When the  German Government notified  the concept for SEW Freital,  the 
privatization  contract  was  concluded  subject  to  the  condition  that  the 
Commission would approve the related aid.  This condition was cancelled by 
agreement of 8 November 1993, when the Council's assent on the basis of the 
Communication of the Commission dated 28 April 1993 was expected (but not 
granted),  so that the  shares  of SEW Freital were transferred in  November 
1993.  The Commission was not aware of this development when it  drafted its 
final decision approving the aid connected to the privatization concept.  This 
is the reason why Article 3 (  1)  of the decision specifies minimum financial 
charges of 3.5%  at the  date of the  privatization  of the company.  It was 
impossible to fulfill that provision because the company was already privatized 
at  the  time  the  decision  was  adopted.  The  German  Government  is 
responsible for this situation because it did not inform the Commission that the 
privatization had already taken place in  November 1993 and  it did not react 
when the Commission announced in December 1993 to include this condition 
in all 6 decisions under Article 95 ECSC. 
The German Government is of the opinion that the ratio presented under the 
said condition is to ensure that the recipient firm would not receive aid to an 
amount that would create a financial situation of the company that was out of 
line with the normal financial ratios of other competitors.  It is of the opinion 
that the technological situation of the company combined with the contractual 
obligation of the purchaser to carry out investments covering total investments 
of at least 170 Mio DM  (out of a total programme of 250 Mio DM planned) 
according  to  a  strict  time  table  would  lead  to  a  situation  which  provides 
comparable  burdens for  the  company,  although  these  burdens  might  not 
appear in a balance sheet. 
In  addition,  it explains  that  the  purchaser  injected  substantial  amounts  of 
finance without taking on bank loans because it was not possible to receive 
such loans before the Commission's approval of the aid connected with the 
privatization concept.  It is of the opinion that it should not make a difference 
whether the necessary financial means are provided by the shareholder or by 
banks. 
Furthermore, it should,  according to the German Government, be taken into 
account that the company would take on a ERP loan of 1  00  Mio DM once the 
aid had been approved by the Commission.  The loan, to be  assessed under 
Article 5 Steel Aids Code, was notified by communication dated 28 July 1994. 
The necessary financial charges of 3.5% would be created only by this loan. 
b)  Appraisal 
It should be noted that due to  a shortcoming of the German Government in 
informing  the  Commission  of  the  relevant  developments  in  this  case,  a - 4  -
condition  was  included  in  the  final  decision  under Article 95  ECSC  that  is 
apparently impossible for the company to fulfill. 
Full compliance with the conditions of the Commission's decision under Article 
95 ECSC would mean that the German Government would have to rescind the 
privatization.  It  would  have  to  re-open  negotiations  with  the  purchaser 
concerning the conditions of a new privatization.  Such negotiations would lead 
logically  to  a  lower  purchase  price  reflecting  the  extra  financial  burden 
imposed  by  the  Commission's  condition.  Besides  not  having  a  major 
economic relevance as to the aid and competition situation of the buyer, such 
a procedure would cause enormous practical and legal difficulties and could 
allow  the  purchaser  to  take  advantage  of a  very  strong  position  in  the 
negotiations. 
However, according to the German Government, sufficient financial charges 
would  appear in  the company's accounts during the  latter months  of 1994, 
when it starts to take on loans to cover the extensive investment programme 
in line with the obligations of the purchaser following the privatization contract. 
The  company  would  therefore  operate  without  the  requested  minimum 
financial  charges  for  less  than  eight  months  after  being  notified .  of  the 
Commission's final decision. 
This  divergence  from  the  conditions  imposed  by  the  Commission  will  be 
discussed  with  the  Council,  bearing  in  mind  the  rather  limited  economic 
relevance compared to the above mentioned scenario in which the conditions 
of privatizations  would  be  brought  in  line  with  the  economic  impact of the 
condition in question.  In this case,  the Commission would have to carry out 
a  close  monitoring  to  ensure  compliance  with  the  condition  by 
31  December 1994 at the latest. 
Ill.  The new monitoring report 
The German Government presented a full range of information in line with the request of 
the Commission.  Already in June 1994, it presented the investment plan of the company 
as foreshadowed during the first monitoring phase. 
1.  Capacity reductions 
The company closed and dismantled the medium section mill with a capacity of 170 
kUy  by 30 June 1994, as stated in the previous monitoring report.  Negotiations with 
possible purchasers outside Europe have not been terminated so far. 
It is intended to close down the remaining light section mill with a capacity of 80 kUy 
by the end of 1995.  The remaining electric arc furnace will be closed down during 
the first half of 1996. 
2.  Investments 
The company carried out the investments shown in the following chart.  An important 
part  of the  investment  planned  for  1993/94  concerns  the  installations  of a  new 
merchant bar mill which will  mainly  be  caried  out during  the  second  half of 1994. 
The mill will be fully operational by the end of 1995/beginning of 1996. - 5  -
investments  investments  total  total 
completed  completed  investments  investment 
X 1000DM  31.12.1993  1st half94  completed  ~s  planned 
·per 30.6.94  1993/94 
crude steel installations  1885  5355  7240 
forging & rolling installations  9977  26137  36114 
re-heating & adjusting in st.  4750  7392  12141 
environment, infrastructure, 
administrationand marketing  1820  1565  3386 
polished steel installations, 
peeling and abrading installations  500  3210  3710 
(Lugau) 
drawn wire installations(Lugau)  189  705  894 
steam production installations,  3072  701  3773 
intemal  communication 
various  13312  6165  19477 
TOTAL  35505  51230  86735  167000 
3.  Reduction of workforce 
The company carried out the following redundancies: 
1993  1. half  total  planned 
costs x 1000 OM  1994 
no of redundancies  990  16  1006  1060 
total costs  8776  132  8908  34000 
covered by 
THA  7571  5  7576 
56ECSC  1164  36  1200 
company  41  91  132 
The information shows that the company carries out the reduction of workforce in line 
with the plan. 
4.  Production 
The company achieved the following production: 
·  :ttmonth average  1993  1. half 1994 
crude steel  1990  4052 
finished products  1635  3950 - 6  -
5.  Sales 
The company sold its products as follows on the different markets: 
In%  1993  1. half1994 
Gennany  89.6  92.2 
EU  11  9.5  7.2 
3rd countries  0.9  0.6 
TOTAL (100% =  x kt)  19.6  8.7 
The average prices  were  given  in  the  report  of the  German Government.  The 
Commission considers them to be within the normal range. 
6.  Financial Performance 
The German Government provided a full range of key financial ratios as requested 
by the Commission.  Concerning turnover and losses the following information was 
presented: 
1993.  1993 ** 
inMioDM 
turnover  71.1  70.5 
losses  14.0  11.85 
ratio turnover /losses  5.95 
*  estimated figures given in the first monitoring report 
**  finally approved figures 
1. half 1994  1994 
annualised 
42.36  84.7 
3.57  7.5 
11.3 
The figures show that the company  is  remarkably (by 90%)  improving its financial 
performance in  a very  short  time.  The  company  appears to be  on  track towards 
viability. 
7.  Aid 
The Commission approved 189 Mio OM loss compensation which has been granted 
by THA.  The Commission also approved a 9 Mio OM guarantee coovering the value 
of stocks and claims of SEW Freital as by 1.1.1993.  The surety obligation has been 
fulfilled by THA.  In addition, it approved up to 34 Mio OM social aid to cover costs 
of redundancies,  of which  15.16 Mio OM  have been  paid  up until June 1994.  The 
Commission further approved  aid  of up to 42 Mio OM  for repair and maintenance 
which have been granted at the beginning of the restructuring. 